Extended Stratification: Immigrant and Native Differences in Individual and Family Labor. by Zhang, Pidi & Sanders, Jimy M.
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Sociology, Department of
Fall 1999
Extended Stratification: Immigrant and Native




University of South Carolina - Columbia, jimsand@sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/socy_facpub
Part of the Sociology Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Sociology, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Publication Info
Sociological Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 4, Fall 1999, pages 681-704.
EXTE N D E D ST RAT I F I CAT1 0 N : 
Immigrant and Native Differences in 
Individual and Family Labor 
Pidi Zhang 
Georgia Southern University 
l imy Sanders 
University of South Carolina 
This article outlines a theoretical system of extended stratification in order to account 
for differences between immigrants and natives in ( 1 )  the amount of time individuals 
devote to paid work and (2) the number of family members participating in paid work. 
The basic argument is that immigrants with a frame of reference that includes being 
socialized in a relatively poor sending society tend to have greater work incentive than 
natives who have been socialized in a richer host society. This variation in work incen- 
tive obtains because the economic rewards achieved through additional work are evalu- 
ated more highly by groups that have as their frame of reference a comparatively poor 
society. According to this argument, the intergroup difference in work incentive should 
obtain even when economic need is held constant. We derived two hypotheses and 
tested them with a comparative analysis of immigrants and natives, including native 
coethnics of the immigrants. At the level of the individual and of the household, the 
findings are largely consistent with the hypotheses. 
An intriguing aspect of social stratification is the upward mobility of foreign-born 
minority groups. Immigrant minorities often ultimately achieve an average standard of living 
that exceeds that of disadvantaged native groups. There are several examples wherein immi- 
grant minority groups approach, and sometimes reach, the economic standing of advantaged 
native groups. These events have transpired in various parts of the world including the 
Pacific Islands, Africa, South and North America, the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast 
Asia (e.g., Sowell 1983; Shibutani and Kwan 1965). The international migrants who have 
built this record of achievement are as diverse as their points of destination. The accom- 
plishments of Armenians, subcontinent Indians, Chinese, Cubans, Jews, Koreans, West 
Indians, and Japanese are among the most widely recognized. 
How is it that so many immigrant minority groups, relocating in various parts of the world 
at different points in time, have been able to move up the economic ladder of the host soci- 
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ety? The aim of this article is to offer a theoretical argument that partly accounts for 
the economic progress of immigrants. The argument hinges on intergroup variation in the 
incentive to work long hours for what natives tend to consider marginal economic gain. 
Because work incentive is more difficult to measure than time devoted to work, the empirical 
part of this article focuses on work time. Although the idea of work incentive is integral to 
our argument, it is the actual performance of work that creates opportunities for upward 
mobility. Consequently, if our argument is to help account for immigrant upward mobility, 
it must do so in terms of explaining intergroup variation in work time (or work effort-we 
use the terms interchangeably, which is consistent with most of the relevant literature). 
It is a tenet of sociology that groups with differing frames of reference often have dif- 
fering interpretations of a situation (Thomas 1931). Our argument assumes that this tenet 
is valid and predicts that group averages in work time vary in systematic patterns because 
of intergroup differences in frames of reference. This variation in frames of reference is 
due to the tendency that immigrants from relatively poor societies are more likely social- 
ized in different environments, with differing structural opportunities, than natives of 
wealthier host societies or immigrants from wealthier sending societies. Consequently, 
groups may vary in the standard by which they evaluate the magnitude of a given eco- 
nomic gain and the costs incurred (e.g., loss of time for leisure) in procuring economic 
gain. The net value one group may attach to a given economic gain may therefore be dif- 
ferent from the net value another group places on such a gain. As a result, what constitutes 
a valuable payoff for additional work effort can vary across groups, with immigrants mov- 
ing from a relatively poor society to a richer society setting the bar lowest in deciding what 
constitutes an acceptable economic return. The result is a tendency for immigrants from 
relatively poor sending societies to have lower reservation wages than either immigrants 
from relatively wealthier sending societies or the natives of the receiving society. In this 
article, we outline a hypothetical explanation of intergroup variation in work time, derive 
two testable hypotheses, and test them on several immigrant and native groups. 
ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT AMONG CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRANTS 
A voluminous literature on the economic experiences of minority immigrants has emerged 
during the past quarter of a century. Studies from Australia, Israel, Canada, France, Ger- 
many, the United Kingdom, and the United States are common. Focused reviews of the liter- 
ature are often published in journals. Attempts to review the broad literature on immigration 
are occasionally undertaken, and these are especially important in helping scholars take 
inventory of the breadth of the field (e.g., Borjas 1994; Waldinger 1989). The review 
included in Richard Alba and Victor Nee (1997, pp. SSO-857) covers the most influential 
lines of inquiry and theoretical development, with a focus on the key themes and debates. 
The theoretical approaches that guide this literature focus on several processes through 
which social stratification is generated. To one degree or another, each hypothetical argu- 
ment either implies or asserts that one reason for the economic progress of many immi- 
grant groups is that their members tend to have strong work incentives and that their 
postimmigration work records reveal a willingness to work long hours, even if the condi- 
tions of work are poor and earnings are low. Some research contends that immigrants have 
unusually strong incentives because they are a nonrandom, self-selected, highly motivated 
subgroup of their home society’s population (e.g., Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1986). Other 
studies suggest that what might look like self-exploitation under difficult work conditions 
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is often an astute investment in gaining work-related experiences and social connections that 
contribute to better employment opportunities down the line (e.g., Bailey and Waldinger 
1991; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Zhou 1992). A third possibility is that immigrants 
work long hours because of preimmigration exposure to grueling work schedules. Accord- 
ing to this view, work time may not so much be a proxy for work incentive as it is a 
reflection of how past work experiences condition immigrants to accept long hours of 
work as a normal part of life. Notwithstanding, work time is still an indicator of how home 
society frames of reference influence immigrants’ willingness to undertake arduous work 
schedules in an effort to improve their circumstances. 
Two earlier attempts to explain the work-related motivations of immigrants who move 
from poorer to richer societies are especially germane to our argument. Edna Bonacich 
(1972) and Michael Piore (1979) consider how sojourners are influenced by home society 
frames of reference. The more immigrants perceive themselves as sojourners, the more 
their social identity remains fixed with their social roles back home. Sojourners identify 
little with their employment role in the host society inasmuch as work is strictly an instru- 
mental device through which they can bring to fruition their aspirations of returning home. 
Hence, immigrants who seriously plan to return home may be disproportionately willing 
to put up with difficult employment circumstances because such circumstances are seen a 
necessary, but temporary, means to an end. Given the evidently permanent settlement prac- 
tices of a large share of contemporary immigrants (particularly “legal” immigrants) to rel- 
atively rich societies, it is difficult to know if a very large percentage of immigrants view 
themselves as sojourners. Nonetheless, Bonacich (1972) and Piore (1979) are highly rele- 
vant to our work because of the importance they place on how reference groups in the 
home society influence the behavior of immigrants. Also, Bonacich (1972, p. 549) argues 
that the poorer the sending society relative to the receiving society, the lower the reserva- 
tion wage of immigrants. We draw on this argument in developing our account of native- 
immigrant differences in work time. 
If immigrants tend to be more motivated than natives to get ahead by working addi- 
tional hours, or if immigrants are simply more accustomed to long work-hours, native 
immigrant differences in actual hours of work are likely to emerge. But because the work 
time of individuals is influenced by their overall economic need (or attainment), including 
their household circumstances (e.g., Ehrenberg 1994), and because the economic circum- 
stances of immigrants from poor sending societies tend to be worse than those of natives 
and immigrants from wealthy societies, it is necessary to control for economic need in 
order to test our argument. Holding constant objective indicators of economic need such as 
per capita household income and occupational attainment, we expect immigrants to work 
more than natives due to the influence of differing frames of reference. That is, controlling 
for economic need, immigrants from poor sending societies will be more motivated than 
natives to add to their work week. The short-term labor supply curve of immigrants, there- 
fore, is less backward bending than that of natives. 
What is the existing evidence as to whether immigrants work longer hours than 
natives? The review by George Borjas (1994) shows that the work effort of some groups of 
foreign-born men in the United States is relatively high, but recent Third World immi- 
grants with little human capital have serious difficulties in the labor market, and this 
adversely affects their work time. Similar findings have been reported for several groups 
of women (Schoeni 1998). When human capital is controlled, immigrant disadvantages in 
work time often attenuate. There is also some evidence that low-skilled immigrants who 
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migrate through family reunification avoid short working hours with the help of their better 
connected, more assimilated relatives (Jasso and Rosensweig 1990). Comparing native-born 
and foreign-born coethnics often reveals smaller intergroup differences in work time than 
when immigrants are compared to majority members of the native-born population (Allens- 
worth 1997; LeLonde and Tope1 1991). Of course, the labor market experiences of immi- 
grants are strongly affected by their age at the time of immigration (Borjas 1994). 
These documented patterns are not encouraging for our argument that immigrants from 
poor sending societies tend to put in more hours of work than natives, once economic need 
is controlled. For the most part, white non-Hispanic natives in the United States appear to 
put in as many or more hours of work than do the foreign-born, and some native-born ethnic 
groups average more hours of work than their foreign-born coethnics. In the face of these 
data, to what degree might our argument contribute to an understanding of differences in 
the work effort of various immigrant and native groups? In the remainder of this article, 
we address this question by proposing a theory of extended stratification that emphasizes 
the influence of intergroup variation in frames of reference and by testing two work-effort 
hypotheses derived from the theory. 
THE EXTENDED STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 
We propose the theory of extended stratification systems. This hypothetical system is rep- 
resented in Figure 1. First-generation immigrants (born and raised in the sending society) 
are distinctive in that they were socialized, well into the life cycle, in a society different 
from the one in which they now live. The social contexts or frames of reference that immi- 
grants have experienced, and have been influenced by, include those of both the sending 
and receiving societies. Consequently, the behavior of immigrants, including economic 
action, is affected by pre- and postimmigration socialization experiences. We suggest that 
having a social frame of reference based on growing up in a sending society that is mark- 
Bottom of the U.S.  
stratification system 
J 
Bottom of the 
extended 
stratification system 2- 
FIGURE 1. ILLUSTRATION OF THE EXTENDED STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 
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edly poorer than the receiving society encourages immigrants to pursue economic actions 
that require sacrifice and hard work. We are hardly the first to make such an argument, but 
we offer a theoretical model, with testable hypotheses, in an effort to explain how eco- 
nomic actions are influenced by the combined influences of being socialized in a relatively 
poor society and earning a living in a richer society. As Figure 1 depicts, the stratification 
system for natives terminates at the lower end of the host social system. For immigrants, 
by contrast, the stratification system extends into the social system of their home country 
and ends at the bottom of that system. 
With the extended stratification system, we emphasize that natives and immigrants have 
different frames of reference. An important dimension of this distinction is that immigrants 
and natives have different reference groups. The reference groups for natives are different 
native status groups. The reference groups for immigrants also include native status 
groups, but because of cultural, social, and economic ties between immigrants and their 
home society, immigrants have additional reference groups. These include different status 
groups in their home country, including their own preimmigration social status. With 
respect to Figure 1,  the reference groups of natives are found within the large cone that 
represents the host population. Some of the reference groups for immigrants are also 
found there, but other reference groups for immigrants are found in the lower part of the 
smaller cone-the population remaining in the home country. 
In economic action, as with many types of social interaction, reference groups 
influence individuals’ sense of how well or how poorly they are doing. That is, the extent 
to which people view their economic situation as acceptable depends partly on the extent to 
which they view themselves as relatively deprived. Given the option, it might be reason- 
able for a native worker to refuse overtime work, if they are satisfied with their economic sit- 
uation or if they view the overtime earnings as so modest that the additional money would 
not appreciably improve their economic situation. Such choices are made with reference to 
the economic situation of the individual and to the groups to which the individual compares 
his well-being. Reference groups, therefore, play a role in determining how people make 
decisions about matters such as what constitutes an appreciable economic improvement. 
The same situation described above might play out differently if the employee is an 
immigrant from a society with a lower standard of living than the host society. Even 
modest additional pay for working overtime may be attractive to a person who has as her 
frame of reference the still lower pay she would receive for comparable work effort in 
her home society. For example, Korean physicians have tended to accept lower status and 
less important positions in the United States than positions they could have in Korea. Fur- 
thermore, Korean physicians who take such positions are often paid less than their native 
counterparts in the United States. Why take such positions? While the pay may be low by 
the standards of U.S. physicians, it is still higher than what the physicians could earn in 
Korea (Shin and Chang 1988). The lower standard of living of the home country com- 
pared with the standard of living of the host country constitutes a major difference 
between the reference groups of immigrants and natives. This difference can result in 
immigrants being more willing than natives to work hard for what natives would view as 
a modest economic gain. That is, the reservation wage of the two groups differs. Thus, the 
differing frames of reference of the two actors play an important role in generating the dif- 
ferences in reservation wages. 
Demographers have long observed that people migrate for economic gains (or potential 
economic gains) and indeed, the prevailing direction of migration is from economically 
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less developed areas to areas of greater economic development (Lee 1966; Massey, Gold- 
ring, and Durand 1994). This tendency implies an important structural difference between 
host and sending societies. Due to the better economic conditions of the host society, the 
same kind of work, or the same amount of work, will typically yield more remuneration in 
the host society. To the immigrant from a poor society, this remuneration represents an 
additional payoff that is there for the taking-all that is required is the willingness to work 
long hours. Natives, by contrast, have no comparable frame of reference and therefore no 
reason to be especially motivated to work longer hours in order to make what they see as 
no better than marginal improvements in their economic situation. For natives, the base- 
line for evaluating improvement is their standard of living and that of their reference 
groups in the host society. For immigrants, the baseline is more complicated. Immigrants’ 
standard of living and those of their host society reference groups play a role, but their 
view of improvement also takes into account how much the additional remuneration raises 
them above the standard of living they would have had back home. Hence, the payoff 
appears greater for immigrants. This greater payoff, or at least a greater appreciation of the 
payoff, gives immigrants additional incentive to gain even marginal economic gains 
through additional work. The degree to which such payoffs provide incentives to work 
more may be moderated by the higher cost of living in the host society. Therefore, the 
greater the margin of economic gain, net of the higher costs of the host society, the greater 
the incentive to undertake long working hours. 
Theories that imply self-selection, such as migration and class-resource theories, point 
out that immigrant populations are often nonrandom samples of the home society’s popu- 
lation. Such theories argue that immigrant groups are only likely to be particularly hard 
working to the degree that they consist of self-selected, highly motivated people. Conse- 
quently, these theories imply that there should be substantial differences in work-related 
behavior between largely voluntary, self-selected immigrant groups and largely nonvolun- 
tary, non-self-selected immigrant groups. It follows that refugee groups that are largely 
characterized by nonvoluntary immigration will be less motivated to work hard than non- 
refugee groups of voluntary immigrants. By contrast, the extended stratification system 
theory predicts that strong motivations to work hard are characteristic of all immigrant 
groups as long as their frames of reference includes a poor home society with limited 
opportunity for upward mobility. 
THE WORK-EFFORT HYPOTHESIS OF THE EXTENDED STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 
The extended stratification theory contends that because people have different socio- 
economic frames of reference, they vary in their willingness to work long hours in an 
effort to achieve modest improvements in their current socioeconomic circumstances. 
Thus, immigrants from relatively poor societies tend to see their richer host society as 
abundant in opportunities for getting ahead through hard work. Immigrants will often be 
more willing than natives to work long hours because they value the economic return more 
highly than native persons who have been raised in a comparatively rich society. It is not 
that most immigrants achieve high standards of living when evaluated by the standards of 
the host society, rather that immigrants often have the opportunity to achieve a consider- 
ably higher standard of living in the host society than they could achieve back home. What 
looks like a modest economic return to a person raised in a wealthy society may be inter- 
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preted as a more meaningful gain by immigrants who compare their current situation to 
the alternative of staying in the home society. 
The work-effort hypothesis of the extended stratification system can be stated as: Zmmi- 
grants from a society with a lower level of economic development than the destination 
country will tend to work more hours than native workers. We expect that this relationship 
is roughly proportional in the sense that the greater the economic gap between the host and 
home society, the greater the work effort gap between immigrants and natives. 
We contend that moving from a relatively poor society with limited opportunity to a 
richer society with greater opportunity encourages immigrants to work long hours so as to 
maximize their economic situation. But it is also possible to derive an alternative hypothe- 
sis about the impact of differing frames of reference on work effort. Having a frame of ref- 
erence that includes a poor home society may lead immigrants to emphasize the lower 
standard of living back home, rather than the higher standard in the host society, in inter- 
preting their postimmigration success. In this case, immigrants may have little incentive to 
work long hours because such a work schedule is unnecessary to achieve a better standard 
of living than they would have had back home. This perspective is related to Piore's (1979, 
pp. 95-98) discussion of target earners, although he attributed this tendency mostly to 
immigrants who planned to return to the homeland. To the degree immigrants who see 
themselves as permanently settled in the host society work toward a low target as an 
acceptable standard of living (the target is low by the standards of the host society but 
much higher with respect to the home society), we would expect that the opposite of our 
hypothetical relationship would obtain. That is, immigrants from poor societies would 
tend to work less than natives. 
The weakness of this alternative hypothesis, in our view, is that the economic actions of 
immigrants are more balanced by both home and host society frames of reference. In most 
cases, we argue, the comparatively greater opportunities for material gain in the host soci- 
ety are sufficient to motivate immigrants to work long hours if that is the only way they 
can improve their standard of living. In testing the work-effort hypothesis, we are also test- 
ing the alternative hypothesis. If our arguments are highly accurate, the work-effort 
hypothesis should be confirmed. By contrast, if the alternative hypothesis is highly accu- 
rate, findings that are the opposite of what we argue should obtain. 
Testing The Work-Effort Hypothesis 
Our dependent variable is work time. The analyses reported below are based on the opera- 
tional variable usual hours worked per week last year. Though not shown, we replicated 
the analyses with total hours worked during the year. The findings of the two analyses are 
virtually identical.' Because the work time variables are badly skewed, which increases 
the chance that outliers will influence the findings and that the disturbance will be het- 
eroskedastic, we analyze logged hours of work. The key independent variables are ethnic- 
ity and nativity. As discussed earlier, we also need to rule out economic circumstances as 
an alternative hypothesis, and therefore we control for two indicators of economic need or 
attainment (per capita household income and occupational prestige as measured by the 
Duncan socioeconomic index). We also control for self-employment and age in order to 
make the findings more generalizable. Research shows that self-employed immigrants 
sometimes work unusually long hours (e.g., Portes and Zhou 1996). Consequently, failure 
to control for self-employment could produce findings that are consistent with our hypoth- 
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esis when such findings are largely attributable to the minority of immigrants who operate 
their own businesses. Age is controlled because relatively inexperienced young workers 
and the oldest workers may have less opportunity and wherewithal to work the same hours 
as the bulk of workers who fall more toward the middle of the age distribution. Analyses 
are conducted separately for women and men.* 
Our initial test compares the work hours of immigrants, who were raised in the sending 
society, to native-born and first-and-a-half generation (born in the sending society, but 
raised in the host society) people who share a common ethnic heritage and ancestral 
homeland. Our analyses provide such comparisons for Hispanic and Asian groups that 
have large immigrant and native populations in the United States. In any population, the 
distribution of work hours can be influenced by local economic conditions. It is therefore 
necessary to control for variation in regional labor markets. Two metropolitan areas, New 
York and Los Angeles, offer the largest populations that meet our needs. We analyzed 
1990 census samples drawn from the five-county Los Angeles metropolitan area. James 
Allen and Eugene Turner ( 1  997) and Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr (1996) 
offer detailed descriptions of the regional economy and population of Greater Los Ange- 
les. Details of the sample and data are available (USDC 1993). Illegal workers, and the 
informal employment circumstances they often experience, are unlikely to be more than 
marginally represented in these samples. 
We included the three largest immigrant groups in the western United States (Mexi- 
cans, Filipinos, and Chinese) because each group also has a large, well-established native 
population. These groups offer several useful comparisons. Mexicans and Filipinos differ 
in terms of Hispanic and Asian heritage, but the Philippine Islands were a Spanish colony 
for 350 years, and this experience left Filipinos with a unique East-West cultural experi- 
ence, including a strong presence of Catholicism. Further, the twentieth-century U. S. influ- 
ence in the Philippines added more Western influence, including the widespread use of the 
English language. The Chinese immigrants in our sample hail from China and Taiwan. In 
Los Angeles, immigrants from these two sending societies vary greatly in attributes and 
resources that can affect employment. For instance, the Taiwanese tend to be younger 
and better educated than immigrants from China. The Taiwanese are also unusually 
affluent, benefiting from Taiwan’s emergence as a relatively rich society.3 
Because the extended stratification theory contends that variation in socioeconomic 
frames of reference predicts variation in work effort, the degree to which a group achieves 
a certain level of postimmigration affluence is also germane to our study. For instance, a 
group from a poor society that achieves a comparatively affluent standing in the host soci- 
ety may not have as strong of a motivation to work long hours as groups from equally poor 
societies who achieve considerably less economic success in the host society. Our sample 
includes immigrant groups whose home societies vary considerably in level of economic 
development. At the group level, the average standard of living in the home society and the 
standard of living achieved in the United States covary positively. However, Filipino immi- 
grants and to a lesser degree, immigrants from China, tend to achieve higher postimmigra- 
tion standards of living than other groups from societies of similar per capita wealth.4 
The extended stratification theory also contends that greater work effort among immi- 
grants is not limited to a presumably highly motivated select sample of voluntary immigrants. 
We hypothesize that both voluntary and nonvoluntary immigrants will work longer hours 
than native workers (born and/or raised in the host society) if they have been raised in a 
society that is less economically developed than the host society. To test this part of the 
argument, we include samples of foreign-born Vietnamese and Salvadorans. The addition 
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of these groups means that we include the two largest Hispanic immigrant groups and 
three of the four largest Asian immigrant groups in the western United States5 
There is little question as to the appropriateness of recognizing the Vietnamese as a 
mostly nonvoluntary refugee group. By contrast, there is a good deal of debate over the 
extent to which the Salvadoran immigrant stream is made up of nonvoluntary refugees. We 
cannot resolve this debate, but given the timing of the civil war in El Salvador and of the 
movement of large numbers of Salvadorans into the United States, it seems clear that this 
migration represents a reasonably good example of nonvoluntary immigration. The Salva- 
dorans and Vietnamese do not have substantial native samples for comparative purposes, 
but we contend that their work effort will be similar to that of voluntary immigrant groups 
from societies that are substantially poorer than the host society. 
Table 1 shows the number of cases by ethnicity, nativity, and sex. We defined the first- 
and-a-half generation as having come to the United States by age twelve or younger. Anal- 
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yses reported throughout the article are replicated with slightly older and younger definitions 
of the first-and-a-half generation. The findings are not affected by the exact age at which the 
distinction is operationalized. The sample members are noninstitutionalized civilians who 
worked at least a total of forty hours in 1989 and are at least eighteen years of age.6 
Our analysis has two parts. The first part involves comparative analyses of the work 
hours of individuals who belong to one of the groups reported in Table 1. Additional com- 
parisons are then made to native-born non-Hispanic whites. These analyses provide a direct 
test of the extended stratification theory as it pertains to the work effort of individuals. The 
second part of the analysis considers the household as the unit of analysis. Here we extend 
the work-effort hypothesis of the extended stratification theory to the work effort of families. 
We contend that immigrants whose frame of reference is a comparatively poor society will 
seek to improve the socioeconomic situation of their family by maximizing the number of 
paid workers living in one household. This part of the analysis takes into account that the 
family, as well as the individual, is an economic actor (Ehrenberg 1997). Immigrant strate- 
gies of upward mobility are influenced by family strategies of childrearing and labor force 
participation rather than simply individual strategies (e.g., Blank and Torrecilha 1998; 
Gold 1992; Jasso and Rosensweig 1990; Massey 1990; Sanders and Nee 1996). 
Findings 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 provide comparisons of the mean of the usual hours worked 
per week (unlogged and logged) by sex, ethnicity, and nativity. Voluntary immigrant 
groups and their native counterparts are reported in panel 1. Even without controlling for 
economic circumstances, each of the foreign-born groups tends to work more than their 
coethnic native counterparts (p < .01). The more rigorous tests of the hypothesis, with per 
capita household income, occupational prestige, self-employment, and age held constant, 
are reported in column 3.7 Columns 4-7 show the degree to which these control variables 
differ across the groups. 
According to our hypothesis, the foreign-born should work more hours than their 
coethnic native counterparts. The findings in column 3 of panel I are consistent with the 
hypothesis. All eight of the comparisons reveal that the foreign-born tend to work more 
hours than their coethnic native counterparts. The largest difference is that women from 
China work approximately 26 percent more hours than native-born Chinese women.8 Fur- 
thermore, among Chinese men and women, immigrants from Taiwan work significantly 
(p < .0l) less than immigrants from China whereas they work significantly (p < ,001) 
more than native-born Chinese. Inasmuch as per capita GDP is far greater in Taiwan than 
in mainland China, this rank ordering among the Chinese conforms to our hypothesis. 
At this point, the findings are consistent with the work-effort hypothesis of the extended 
stratification theory. By turning to panel 2 of Table 2, we consider whether the hypothesis 
is also supported by data from groups that are more characteristic of nonvoluntary immi- 
gration. According to our argument, both nonvoluntary and voluntary immigrants should 
work more than native groups when the sending societies are poorer than the receiving 
society. Because Vietnamese and Salvadorans did not have large well-established native 
populations in 1990, our comparison must be across ethnic lines. The most reasonable 
comparisons are between Hispanics (Salvadorans and native Mexicans) and Asians (Viet- 
namese and native Chinese and Filipinos). 
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As column 3 (Table 2, panel 2) shows, all six comparisons between nonvoluntary 
immigrants and natives are consistent with the hypothesis. This implies that the work- 
effort hypothesis is also applicable to nonvoluntary immigrant groups. This interpretation, 
however, must be considered tentative until more precise comparative analyses can test the 
hypothesis for nonvoluntary immigrants. Earlier we discussed two limitations of our anal- 
yses involving immigrants from Vietnam and El Salvador that warrant repeating. First, in 
the absence of a native-born coethnic comparison group, the analyses may confound 
effects due to nativity and to ethnicity. Second, it is unclear to what degree the immigra- 
tion stream from El Salvador represents a movement of nonvoluntary immigrants or refu- 
gees. The case of the Vietnamese seems to be more clear-cut. 
What can we conclude? Five ethnic groups, including the most populous ones that 
include large native and foreign-born populations, have been considered. Each immigrant- 
native comparison conforms to the work-effort hypothesis of the extended stratification 
theory. Consequently, we conclude that the extended stratification theory’s work-effort 
hypothesis is useful in understanding processes through which immigrants tend to work 
more hours than their native-born coethnics. One limitation of these findings, however, is 
that they pertain only to minority groups. The theoretical and practical importance of the 
findings will be greater if immigrants have a similar edge in work effort when they are 
compared to native non-Hispanic whites. 
The comparative edge in work effort found for immigrants may facilitate their move up 
the economic ladder in comparison to their coethnic native-born counterparts. But how 
does the work effort of these immigrant groups compare to that of native-born white non- 
Hispanics? This question is addressed in Table 3. 
Column 1 reports mean differences in logged work hours for women. Each minority 
group is compared to non-Hispanic white natives. Column 2 provides the same informa- 
tion for men. These intergroup comparisons obtain with occupational prestige, per capita 
household income, self-employment, and age held constant. Without these controls, we 
know from the research cited earlier that native-born white non-Hispanic men tend to 
work as much or more than other groups. In our sample, the simple mean of usual hours 
worked per week is 42.3 hours for white non-Hispanic male natives. Only Chinese immi- 
grants from China and Taiwan work comparable hours. The picture is different for women. 
White non-Hispanic female natives averaged 36.6 hours of work per week. The simple 
mean of each female immigrant group is higher than this figure. Thus, the data for women 
are consistent with our work-effort hypothesis even without controls for self-employment 
and economic circumstances. For men, however, the simple comparison of work hours 
runs counter to our hypothesis. We now turn to Table 3 to see whether the pattern predicted 
by the work-effort hypothesis emerges once controls for self-employment, age, and eco- 
nomic circumstances are applied. 
In comparing foreign-born women to white non-Hispanic women, we find unanimous 
support for the work-effort hypothesis. Immigrants tend to work more than non-Hispanic 
white natives. Moreover, women from mainland China tend to work more than women 
from Taiwan, which is also consistent with our hypothesis inasmuch as Taiwan is the 
more affluent society. Two of the native-born groups, Filipinas and Chinese, average 
fewer hours of work than native white non-Hispanic women. That the findings con- 
form to the work-effort hypothesis is not surprising given the patterns described in the 
previous paragraph. 
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TABLE 3. USUAL HOURS OF WORK PER WEEK 
COMPARISONS WITH NATIVE-BORN, NON-HISPANIC WHITES 
Mean Differences 
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* Foreign-born minus native whites, net of SEI, age, per capita household income, and self-employment. 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Among men, four of the six immigrant groups average more working hours than white 
non-Hispanic natives. Men from Taiwan represent one of the two exceptions. Taiwanese 
men work comparable hours to those worked by white non-Hispanic men. Despite this 
finding, our hypothesis is still partly supported when Chinese immigrants are considered. 
In addition to working more than white non-Hispanics, immigrants from mainland China 
tend to work more than immigrants from the more affluent Taiwan. Because Taiwan is by 
far the most affluent sending society under consideration, by itself, the failure of men from 
Taiwan to work more than white non-Hispanic native-born men would probably be innoc- 
uous for the work-effort hypothesis. But support for our hypothesis is more seriously 
clouded by the finding that, among men, immigrants from Vietnam tend to work less than 
native non-Hispanic whites. At first glance, this finding seems to support the self-selection 
hypothesis that implies that nonvoluntary immigrant groups are less motivated to work 
hard than are self-selected voluntary immigrant groups. This interpretation, however, is 
problematic. First, female immigrants from Vietnam do tend to work more than compara- 
ble white non-Hispanic female natives. Second, immigrants from El Salvador, both men 
and women, tend to work more hours than non-Hispanic white natives. Neither the self- 
selection hypothesis nor our work-effort hypothesis accounts for the finding that obtains 
for men from Vietnam. Yet our hypothesis is supported when men from Vietnam are com- 
pared to Chinese and Filipino native-born Americans (Table 2). Thus, even in the case of 
men from Vietnam, our work-effort hypothesis receives partial support. 
What do these findings imply for the view that immigrants work their way up the eco- 
nomic ladder through a tendency to work unusually long hours? Generally, we find that 
net of self-employment, age, and economic circumstances, foreign-born men and women 
tend to devote more time to work than their native-born coethnic counterparts. For the most 
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part, this conclusion can be extended to a comparison of immigrants and non-Hispanic 
white natives, although male immigrants from Vietnam tend to work fewer hours than 
white non-Hispanic native men. 
WORK EFFORT, STRATIFICATION, A N D  FAMILIES 
At the level of the individual, the work-effort hypothesis of the extended stratification 
theory appears to be useful for explaining intergroup variation in hours of work. Further- 
more, the processes described by the theory have implications for social stratification. But 
the analyses thus far reported ignore the weighty reliance that immigrants place on the 
family as an economic actor. There is a strong tendency for immigrants to pursue eco- 
nomic action through familial as well as individual actions. It is not that the development 
of family-based economic strategies and the pursuit of upward mobility through family 
actions pertain only to immigrants, but a good deal of research shows that immigrant 
groups that form families in the host society rely heavily on family strategies (see the studies 
cited earlier). For many immigrants, especially those with language difficulties and human 
capital that is discounted in the host society, the family is a key resource to draw on and to 
organize economic action around in an effort to overcome the difficulties of earning a 
good living. Labor power within the family household is an important resource that immi- 
grants frequently utilize. Immigrants may be able to gain economic ground on natives by 
placing comparatively more family workers into the paid labor force. 
Do immigrant-headed households place more family members in the work force than 
other households? Yes. As shown in Table 4, each immigrant group averages more family 
labor per household than white non-Hispanics? Most immigrant groups average about one- 
half more workers per household than the native white average of 1.67. But immigrants from 
TABLE 4. NUMBER OF FAMILY WORKERS PER HOUSEHOLD: 
COMPARISONS W I T H  NATIVE-BORN, NON-HISPANIC WHITES 
Simple Mean 
Family Workers Differences: Minorities 

































*** p < ,001. 
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the most affluent sending society, Taiwan, tend to have family workforces closer to the white 
average. Native Filipino- and native Mexican-headed households also have somewhat 
more family labor per household than white non-Hispanics. In each case, immigrant- 
headed households tend to have more family workers than households headed by their 
coethnic native counterparts (p < .O l ) ;  this also holds for the comparisons involving 
nonvoluntary immigrants (Salvadorans versus Mexican natives; Vietnamese versus Chi- 
nese and Filipino natives). 
Table 4 is consistent with the extension of the work-effort hypothesis in that immigrant- 
headed households tend to have more workers than households headed by their coethnic 
native counterparts and more workers than households headed by white non-Hispanic 
natives. Yet having relatively more family members in the workforce is not a guarantee of 
economic progress. The economic impact of family labor is contingent on other character- 
istics of the household. Having more family workers in the household is likely to translate 
into the greatest economic impact when the labor advantage is derived from households 
with relatively few dependents. The degree to which the living arrangements of immi- 
grants differ from those of natives, such that immigrant households not only have more 
workers, but also have more people, will moderate the degree to which a larger labor pool 
facilitates reducing the economic disadvantages of immigrants. Because two-thirds of cur- 
rent legal immigration falls into family reunification categories (USDC 1997), we might 
anticipate that immigrant living arrangements differ in ways that result in more family 
members as well as more family workers. 
An important element of social organization that facilitates immigrant households in 
establishing a numeric advantage in family workers is the household type. Certain types of 
households are conducive to having more working-age family members and immigrants 
are disproportionately likely to live in such households. Table 5 ,  panel 1, shows two ways 
in which the organization of immigrant households contributes to more potential labor 
power in one household. Column 1 of panel 1 (Table 5 )  shows that when the householder 
is an immigrant, the odds that the household is a family household (versus a nonfamily 
household) are much greater than when the householder is a native white non-Hispanic. In 
each case, immigrant-headed households are also more likely to be family households 
than households headed by their coethnic native counterparts (p < .OOl),  and the pattern 
also obtains for the comparisons involving the nonvoluntary immigrant groups (Vietnam- 
ese versus native Chinese and Filipinos; Salvadorans versus native Mexicans). 
Column 2 of panel I (Table 5 )  compares the odds that households include a subfamily. 
Households headed by foreign-born and native minorities are much more likely to include 
a subfamily than households headed by native non-Hispanic whites. The odds of this type 
of living arrangement are greater for each of the immigrant groups than for their coethnic 
native counterparts (p < .001). Again, this latter finding also holds for the comparisons 
pertaining to the nonvoluntary immigrant groups. 
Immigrant-headed households may increase their economic progress by having several 
family workers living under one roof. However, family living arrangements that increase 
the number of working-age residents are also likely to increase the overall number of resi- 
dents, including dependents. Immigrants’ efforts to reduce the economic gap between 
themselves and non-Hispanic whites, by having more family members in the workforce, 
will be most successful when the households of the two groups are comparable except for 
the number of workers. But as we see in panel 2 (Table 5 )  immigrant-headed households 
tend to have more relatives and hence more people to support with the household’s labor 
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TABLE 5. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS BY ETHNlClTY A N D  NATIVITY 
OF THE HOUSEHOLDER 
PANEL 1 Number of Households: 140,964 
Family Households: 104,733 
Subfamily Households: 5,808 
Nonfamily Households: 36,23 1 
In Reference to Households Headed by 
Non-Hispanic White Natives 
Odds that Residence 
Is a Family Household 
Odds that Residence 
Is a Subfamily 
vs. a Nonfamily Household vs. 
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force.'" This implies that the potential economic advantage of having more workers in the 
family household is diluted by the necessity of providing for a larger family. The smallest 
immigrant-white gap in average family members per household is one person (Taiwanese) 
and the largest is about two and one-half persons (Mexicans). In each case, immigrant- 
headed households tend to have more family members than households headed by their 
coethnic native counterparts (p < .001), and this also holds for the comparisons involving 
nonvoluntary immigrant groups. 
Together, Tables 4 and 5 show that although immigrant-headed households tend to have 
a numerical advantage in family workers, these households also tend to be organized in 
such a way as to contain more family members that must be fed, clothed, and generally 
provided for. Hence, what appears to be an immigrant household advantage in labor may 
simply be an artifact of different living arrangements and family size. While economies of 
scale apply to many routine costs, and doubling up in housing can significantly reduce 
total rental or mortgage costs, it is nonetheless almost certainly the case that the potential 
for making economic headway through living arrangements that increase the family labor 
pool is moderated by the many costs that are associated with maintaining a large family. It 
is therefore questionable as to how much upward mobility can be obtained by having com- 
paratively more family members in the labor force, if the way this is achieved is simply to 
have more people living in one household. 
When household characteristics that influence the number of family workers are held 
constant, do households that are headed by immigrants place more family members in the 
workforce than other households? The answer to this question is critical in understanding 
the degree to which the immigrant household advantage in family labor may contribute to clos- 
ing the economic gap between immigrants and natives. This question is examined in Table 6. 
The dependent variable in Table 6 is the natural logarithm of the sum of family workers 
in one household. As with hours of work, this variable is badly skewed, and modeling the 
logged term mitigates against the undue influence of outliers and against heteroskedasticity. 
Four variables are specified in order to control for intergroup variation in the household 
characteristics reported in Table 5. Three of these are dummy variables that distinguish 
married couple family households, family households other than married couple house- 
holds (nonfamily households are the reference); and the presence of at least one subfamily 
in the household. The number of family members in the household is also controlled. We 
control for several additional characteristics of the household that may influence how 
many family members are in the workforce. These include the presence of at least one 
minor child, the presence of at least one adult over the age of sixty-four, and linguistically 
isolated households (no adults or older teenagers who speak English). We also control for 
the sex, age, occupational prestige, and earnings of the householder. Logged earnings are 
specified so as to model what we expect to be a nonlinear relationship. The procedure 
described in note 7, with regard to per capita household income, is followed. Also controlled 
are nine dummy variables that distinguish the ten ethnic-nativity groups we consider.11 
The findings in Table 6 reveal the importance of several household characteristics in 
predicting the number of family workers per household. Each of the three controls for 
household type (the first three coefficients listed) are associated with increases in the size of 
the family workforce. The effect of an additional family member is also positively related to 
the number of family members working for wages. The largest of the coefficients is inter- 
preted as, on average, married couple family households have 72 percent more family 
workers than nonfamily households (see note 8). By contrast, the presence of children, the 
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TABLE 6. OLS ESTIMATES OF THE LOGGED NUMBER 
OF WORKING FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE HOUSEHOLD 
Independent Variables B SE 
Married couple family household 
Family household other than married couple 
Subfamily in family household 
Number of family members in household 
Person under 18 in household 
Person over 64 in household 
Linguistically isolated household 
Female householder 
Age of householder 
SEI of householder 

























































Notes: Households with a white non-Hispanic householder are the reference category. The regression 
coefficients and standard errors of the relationships involving age and SEI have been multiplied by 100 in order 
to show nonzero numbers. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < ,001. 
presence of adults of retirement age, and households that are linguistically isolated tend to 
have relatively fewer family workers. With the exception of earnings, the characteristics of 
the householder are either not significantly related to the size of the family workforce or 
they have only weak substantive associations. 
The effects of ethnicity and nativity, net of household characteristics, indicate that four 
of the six groups of immigrant-headed households tend to have more workers than house- 
holds with a native white non-Hispanic householder. These include households headed by 
immigrants from China, El Salvador, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The strongest ethnic- 
ityhativity relationship is that households headed by Filipino immigrants tend to have a 
net advantage in the size of the family labor pool of approximately 12 percent in compari- 
son to households headed by native non-Hispanic whites. Households headed by Filipino 
immigrants also average larger labor pools than households headed by native Filipinos 
(p < .OOl). Similarly, households headed by Chinese immigrants average larger family 
labor pools than either households headed by native-born Chinese (p < .O l )  or households 
headed by immigrants from comparatively affluent Taiwan (p < .001). 
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The two exceptions to our hypothesis are households headed by immigrants from Mexico 
and from Taiwan. Although the magnitude of both coefficients translates into a modest 
substantive relationship, both relationships are statistically significant and contrary to our 
hypothesis. According to our arguments, the finding that pertains to the Taiwanese is largely 
a reflection of the affluent level of economic development in Taiwan. Consequently, this 
finding is probably not a serious challenge to our work-effort hypothesis. The other excep- 
tion, however, clearly contradicts the hypothesis. Net of the household characteristics con- 
trolled in Table 6, households headed by immigrants from Mexico not only fail to have more 
workers than households headed by native non-Hispanic whites, they tend to have compara- 
tively smaller labor forces. In Table 4 we saw that households headed by Mexican immi- 
grants have relatively large workforces, but Table 6 demonstrates that this labor advantage 
fails to obtain once household characteristics are held constant. 
We examined whether the exceptional case of Mexicans could be accounted for by the 
fact that their households average more family members and more dependents than other 
households (Tables 4 and 5: family members minus family workers). To test this possibil- 
ity, we specified an interaction between the number of family members and households 
headed by immigrants from Mexico (not shown). The estimates yield a main effect of .129 
for households headed by Mexican immigrants and an interaction effect of -.036. Combin- 
ing terms shows that households headed by Mexican immigrants tend to have more 
workers than households headed by native non-Hispanic whites when family size is small. 
Once family size reaches about four persons, the relationship becomes consistent with that 
reported in Table 6. Consequently, the exceptional case of households headed by immi- 
grants from Mexico does not materialize in small families. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have introduced the extended stratification theory in an effort to help account for the 
upward mobility of immigrants from poor societies. The theory contends that because 
immigrants have as their frame of reference a poor society with limited opportunity for 
upward mobility, they see their own circumstances in a wealthier host society as full of 
opportunities for those who are willing to work hard and sacrifice. It is not so much that 
immigrants are a select sample of highly motivated people from the sending society; 
rather, it is moving from a poor society with limited opportunities to a richer society with 
more opportunities that motivates immigrants to work hard. Consequently, our argument 
applies to voluntary and nonvoluntary immigrants alike, so long as the sending society is 
poorer than the receiving society. 
At the individual level, we find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that immi- 
grants from poor societies work longer hours than their coethnic native counterparts. The 
pattern holds for both sexes and for nonvoluntary as well as voluntary immigrants. These 
findings support the extended stratification theory and thereby help us understand one way 
in which immigrants make up economic ground on their native minority counterparts. 
When we compare the immigrants to native white non-Hispanics, immigrants also tend 
to work more than whites. Among men, however, we find that Vietnamese immigrants tend to 
work fewer hours than white non-Hispanic natives. This exception to our hypothesis is 
only partial in that Vietnamese men tend to work more hours than the two native-born 
Asian groups under consideration. Consequently, we can report strong but incomplete sup- 
port for the work-effort hypothesis as it applies to individuals. 
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We have also considered the argument that immigrants disproportionately rely on the 
family as an economic actor. Adding this argument to the logic of the work-effort hypoth- 
esis leads to the hypothesis that immigrant-headed households tend to place more workers 
into the labor force than otherwise similar households headed by natives. All of the immi- 
grant groups we studied have more family workers than households headed by white non- 
Hispanics. But it is also true that immigrants tend to live in the types of households that 
have more people, including dependents. Thus, the degree to which immigrant-headed 
households can gain ground on white-headed households depends partly on the economies 
of scale of reducing per person costs in comparatively larger families. Net of several 
household controls, most of the immigrant groups have an advantage over households 
headed by non-Hispanic white natives in the number of family workers. Consequently, the 
extension of the work-effort hypothesis to the size of the family household workforce is 
largely consistent with the findings. However, we uncovered one clear exception. With 
household characteristics held constant, the number of workers in households headed by 
Mexican immigrants is less than that of households headed by native white non-Hispanics 
except when the household is small. Much like the individual-level analyses, our household- 
level analyses tend to support the extension of the work-effort hypothesis, but the support 
is not quite unanimous. 
We contend that the work-effort hypotheses tested here are useful in the study of 
stratification and the economic mobility of immigrants. We believe that the theoretical 
argument underlying the hypotheses points to an important structural dimension that helps 
to explain intergroup variation in the postimmigration experiences of newcomers and how 
native and immigrant differences in economic action may be better understood. 
At its present stage, the extended stratification theory must undergo additional tests 
before we can rigorously evaluate its explanatory value. Yet the theory has already pro- 
vided guidance in suggesting two hypotheses; our findings indicate that these hypotheses 
are informative. Furthermore, it is possible that the same intergroup variation in frames of 
reference that we have found to associate with the work time of individuals and the number 
of family workers per household may also help to explain additional intergroup differences 
in actions that reflect attempts to get ahead. For instance, research into intergroup differ- 
ences in outcomes such as the savings-to-earnings ratio of families or the academic perfor- 
mance of children might be informed by the frame of reference argument of the extended 
stratification theory. We hope this article will reinforce current interest in how the preimmigra- 
tion experiences of newcomers influence their social and economic actions in the host society. 
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NOTES 
1. Substantively and theoretically, both measures of work time allow us to compare the amount 
of work time reported by immigrants and natives. Usual hours worked per week may have a slight 
advantage in measurement. Any measurement problems of work hours per week are also present in 
total work hours per year inasmuch as the former is included in the latter. But total work hours per 
year may be adversely affected by inconsistency over how spells of paid nonwork, such as vacations, 
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are treated. For instance, some full-time, year-round workers with two weeks of paid vacation may 
report fifty-two weeks of work whereas others may report fifty weeks. Similarly, some workers 
may be more precise than others in reporting weeks worked by taking into account the number of 
nonworking holidays or days missed due to illness. Consequently, we prefer the measure of weekly 
hours of work. 
2. We include unpaid family workers as self-employed for reasons similar to those reported by 
Sanders and Nee (1996). Davis and Smith (1994) link three-digit census occupational codes to the 
appropriate SEI value of the Duncan socioeconomic index. 
3. In 1995, the per capita GNP of Taiwan was five times that of Mexico and China. The other 
sending societies relevant to our study are poorer than Mexico and the Philippines (USCD 1997). 
4. Whether we considered individual earnings, individual income, family income, or household 
income, the immigrants rank as follows: Taiwanese (most affluent), Filipinos, mainland Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Mexicans, and Salvadorans (least affluent). At the individual-level, white non-Hispanic 
natives are most affluent, but native Chinese and immigrants from Taiwan are not far behind. At the 
family and household levels, Chinese natives are most affluent, with whites and immigrants from 
Taiwan close behind. By far the poorest groups are immigrants from Mexico and El Salvador. 
5. Koreans slightly outnumber Vietnamese in Greater Los Angeles. Because Koreans are a 
largely voluntary immigrant group without a large, well-established native population (adults), they 
were not included in our analyses. 
6. We tried to exclude as few of the working adults as possible so as to avoid the potential com- 
plications that can result from censoring variables (Berk 1983). This means we set a relatively low 
requirement for hours of work in order to be included in the sample, and we avoided blatent censor- 
ing, such as the exclusion of workers beyond a certain age. 
7. Control was applied with OLS. Because we expected a nonlinear relationship between work 
time and per capita household income, this independent variable was logged. A difference of say 
$lO,OOO in per capita household income between two hypothetical cases with per capita household 
income of $5,000 and $15,000, respectively, was expected to be more strongly related to work effort 
than a $lO,OOO difference between households with per capita household income of $90,000 and 
$100,000 respectively. The logged transformation required positive values, and because self- 
employment losses resulted in some households having negative income, we added a constant value 
to all cases. This operation does not distort the estimates reported in column 3 of Table 2. 
8. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) demonstrate how to transform a semilogged regression 
coefficient into an estimate of the percentage change in the dependent variable that is attributable to 
the distinction represented by a dummy independent variable. The estimate of 26 percent is obtained 
from (eB - 1)lOO or (2.72.229 - 1)100 where .229 is the semilogged regression coefficient. Interpre- 
tation of semilogged regression coefficients that pertain to interval or ratio independent variables 
approximates the conventional interpretation of a percentage change in Y for a unit change in X. 
9. The number of family workers is obtained with a program that counts the number of family 
members age eighteen and over per household who are working. The census file contains a variable 
for the number of family workers, but it is top coded at three and is therefore inadequate for our needs. 
10. When a person lives with no family members, the census variable that counts the number of 
family members living under one roof is coded zero. Therefore, no cases are coded one. We recode 
values of zero to equal one. That is, we count each individual as a member of his or her own family 
whereas the census variable only does this when there are at least two family members residing in 
the same household. 
1 1. In analyses not shown, we also controlled for whether the householder was self-employed. 
The findings were identical to those reported in Table 6. We prefer to omit self-employment from the 
model because most of the existing literature contends that family structure and the size of the fam- 
ily labor pool contributes to the establishment and successful operation of small immigrant-owned 
businesses (e.g., Sanders and Nee 1996). By including self-employment as an independent in our 
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model, we would be turning the causal argument backwards. Also, all of the analyses based on logged 
dependent variables were estimated with the unlogged terms and only minor differences obtain. 
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